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Sectorial Wages and the Real Exchange Rate
ABSTRACT
Consider a multi—sector economy subject to an exogenous demand shock
that alters the equilibrium structure of relative prices. How should the
structure of sectorial wages adjust in response to such a shock? This
question is addressed in the context of a multi—sector model of an open—
economy producing internationally tradable and non—tradable goods. In order
to focus on intersectorial wage structure without abandoning the competitive
neoclassical paradigm we assume that workers differ from each other in their
absolute and relative skills. Such differences result in equilibrium wage
differentials which are affected by the exogenous real shock. Cost of
negotiations result in labor market contracts which set nominal wages in
advance of the realization of the stochastic shocks. The analysis provides
formulae for the optimal sectorial wage—indexation rules. The optimal rules
alter both the absolute and the relative structure of sectorial nominal
wages. We examine the dependence of the optimal wage adjustments on the
degree of heterogeneity of the skill distribution and on the degree to which
the economy is open to international trade; we also study the effects of
various shocks and policies on the real exchange rate, real wages and the
distribution of income.
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(312)962—7260 (312)962—8253Consider a multi—sector economy subject to anexogenous demand shock that
alters the equilibrium structure of relative prices. How shouldthe structure of
sectorial wages adjust in response to such a shock? Generalequilibrium analysis
since the classic article by Stolper and Samuelson (19141) hasclarified the equi-
librium relation between commodity and factor prices foran economy in which
factors of production are fully mobile among sectors and factor returnsare fully
flexible. This analysis has been extended to situations in which factormobility
is limited (e.g. Jones (1971), Mayer (19711) and Mussa (19714)) and factorrewards
are rigid (e.g. Brecher (19714), Heiprnan (1977), Johnson (1965) and Neary (1980)).
In these studies the labor force is assumed to behomogeneous and, therefore,
labor mobility ensures that wages per worker are equalizedacross sectors. In
practice, however, the labor force is likely to be heterogeneous since the rela-
tive skills of workers are not the same. The dissimilaritiesamong workers result
in equilibrium intersectoral wage differentials. Withheterogeneous workers real
shocks call for differential adjustments of sectorialwages.
In this paper we address the question of how should sectorialwages be
adjusted in response to exogenous shocks when the labor force isheterogeneous.In
order to conform with stylized facts we assume that in the short—runwages are
governed by wage contracts. The economy produces tradable and non—tradablegoods
and is assumed to be "small" so that it is a price taker in theworld market for
tradable goods. In order to focus on the intersectoriaj.wage structure without
abandoning the competitive neoclassical paradigm, we assume that workers differ
from each other in their absolute and relative skills. Suchdifferences result in
an equilibrium intersectorj.al wage differentials. In modelling the distribution
of skills we adopt the formulation suggested by Rosen (1978)and applied by Mussa
(1982b). In addition, we allow for labor—market contractsaccording to which
nominal wages are set in advance of the realization of the stochasticshocks. As2
inGray (1976)andFischer (1977), this labor—market convention reflects the cost
of negotiations and results in some short—run stickiness of nominal wages. This
short—run stickiness impacts on resource allocation and imposes welfare cost. The
main purpose of our analysis is to provide formulae for the differential sectorial
wage adjustment which reduces (or even nullifies) the undersirable effects of this
stickiness. The formulae may be viewed as policy rules for sectorial wage indexa—
tion or, alternatively, as characteristics of optimal sectoral wage contracts.
The key difference between the conventional analysis of optimal wage indexation
andours is that the conventional analysis is conducted within a one—sector model
with homogeneous labor whereas ours is conductedwithin a multi—sector model with
heterogeneouslabor. As a result in our framework exogeneous shocks to aggregate
demandcall for adjustments of both absoluteand the relative wages.
Theformal model is outlined in section I which specifies the supply of
output,the employment of labor and private and government demands. Section II
provides the solution of the model for the intermediate run ——arun during which
all wage contracts can be renegotiated and wages are flexible. In this context we
determine the equilibrium values of the real exchange rate the level of output and
sectorial real wages consequent on an exogenous change in aggregate demand for
domestic goods. Section III provides the corresponding solution of the model for
the short run during which wages are given by the prevailing labor—market con-
tracts.It is shown that an important factor underlying the short—run conse-
quences of changes in aggregate demand is the accompanying nominal exchange rate
policy. The main contribution of the paper is contained in section IV. There, we
provide theprecise optimal nominal—wage rules necessary forthe simultaneous
attainmentofthe undistorted equilibrium relative arid absolute sectorial wages
and resource allocation. In this context we examine the dependence of the wage
adjustment formulae on the degree of heterogeneity of the distribution of relative3
skills and on the degree to which the economy is open to internationaltrade.
Finally, section V contains concluding remarks. The paper is followed by an
Appendix that examines the impact of the changes in aggregate demand on the
distribution of income in the short run and in the long run.
I. The Model
In this section we outline the building blocks of the model. These
building blocks contain a specification of the supply, including an analysis of
the factors determining the levels of commodity output and laborinput, and a
specification of the demand.
The economy is assumed to produce two classes of goods: tradables,XT, and
non—tradables, XN, using linear homogenous production functions. We adopt the
specific—factor model of Jones (1971), Mussa (19711) and Mayer (19711). In that
model each sector is assumed to employ factors of production that are sector—





where LT and LN denote, respectively, labor services used inproducing tradeable
and non—tradable goods. The marginal product of labor is assumed to bepositive
and diminishing, and we suppress the specific factors in the formulation of the
production functions.
In order to have a meaningful analysis of intersectoriaJ.wage structure, we
adopt a formulation suggested by Rosen (1978) and applied by Mussa (1982b)14
according to which workers differ in their skills. The transformation between LT
and LN reflects the assumption that the relative skills of workers in producing
the various commodities are not the same. Figure 1 motivates the argument. Let
the skills of the 1th worker be such that his labor services per unit of time of
employment in the tradable goods sector are L, and his labor services per unit of
time of employment in the non—tradable goods sector are L1. The skills of each
worker can be represented in Figure 1 by a given point. Thus, point a indicates
that worker A provides L labor services if employed in the tradable goods
sector, and L if employed in the non—tradable goods sector. Each worker in the
economy is represented by a point in Figure 1. Accordingly, point b corresponds
to worker B whose relative skills are more appropriate for the production of
tradable goods. The allocation of workers between sectors is determined by the
relative intersectorial wages. Wages per unit of labor services in the tradable
and the non—tradable goods sectors are denoted by WT and WN, respectively. If the
wage ratio is (WN/WT), then each worker i whose productivity ratio, (L/L),
exceeds the wage ratio (like worker B) will prefer employment in the tradable
goods sector, and each worker whose productivity ratio falls short of the given
wage ratio (like worker A) will prefer employment in the non—tradable goods
sector. Marginal workers whose productivity ratio coincide with the wage ratio
(like worker C) will be indifferent as to the sector of employment. The given
wage ratio is associated with a given intersectoral allocation of employment. The
supply of labor services to the non—tradable goods sector, LN, is the sum of the
labor services of all workers whose productivity ratio (L/L) is smaller than the
wage ratio (WN/WT). Analogously, LT is the sum of the labor services provided by
the workers whose productivity ratio (L/L) exceed the given wage ratio. In the
subsequent discussion we will refer to LN and LT as the supply of labor provided
to the two sectors. This supply is measured in units of labor services rather4
'C
Figure1: Relative Skills of Labor and the Wage Ratio.
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than number of workers.1 To each and every wage ratio, (WN/WT), corresponds an
allocation (LT/LN)o. The set of possible allocations defines a labor
tion function according to which
(2) LT =LT(LN)
The labor transformation function is shown in Figure 2. Its slope at each point
is the productivity ratio of the marginal workers. For a marginal worker who is
represented by point a in Figure 1 ,theproductivity ratio, L/L, equals the wage
ratio (WN/WT). Thus, the slope of the labor transformation function at the
equilibriumintersectorial allocation of labor,and L,is the wage ratio. In
terms of Figure 2, this allocation is represented by pointA0 at which the slope
of the labor transformation function is
(WN/WT)o.This relation implies that
dLT
(3)
Thewage ratio which determines the allocation of labor and, thereby, the
level of production is uniquely related to the relative price of the final goods.
Specifically, profit maximization requires that the wage in each sector equals the
value of the marginal product of labor. Thus,
W(ax/aL) P N N N N
T T T T
Equations (3)and()implythat in equilibrium,
dL (ax /3L )P
dLN (axT/LT)\




Taking the logarithmic derivatives of (5), expressing in terms of elasticities and
denoting the percentage change in the amount of labor services employed in the
non—tradable goods sector by N' yields
(6) =
NTO
An analogous expression can be obtained for ZT the percentage change in the
amount of labor services employed in the tradable goods sector. In equation (6),
q denotes the percentage change in the real exchange rate, N and
denote the (absolute values of the) elasticities of the marginal products of labor
in the two sector with respect to labor services employed in producing non—
tradable goods, and 0 denotes the (absolute value of the) elasticity of labor
services employed in the production of non—tradable goods with respect to the wage
ratio; thus 0= —dlog L/dlo (WN/WT). Since in equilibrium along the labor trans-
formation function in Figure 2 the wage ratio equals dLT/dLN, it follows that 8
measures the elasticity of LN along the labor transformation function. When the
relative skills of all workers are the same the elasticity of the labor transfor-
mation function is infinite and the schedule in Figure 2 becomes a straight line.
The larger the difference in the relative skills of different workers the smaller
is 0 and the larger is the curvature of the labor transformation function.
In the subsequent analysis we examine the effects of disturbances on the
equilibrium of the short run and the intermediate run. We define the length of
the run in terms of the degrees of nominal wage flexibility and intersectorial
labor mobility. Thus, the short run is defined as the run during which nominal
wages are given by labor contracts; the intermediate run is defined as the run
during which nominal wages are flexible but the distribution of relative skills is7
given. Therefore, in the intermediate run workers are mobile between sectors
subject to the labor transformation function of Figure 2.2
The expression in equation (6) provides the link between the real exchange
rate and the amount of labor services employed in the non—tradable goods sector
or, more precisely, the link between the percentage changes in these variables.
This, together with the definition of 0, provides the link between the real ex-
change rate q and the wage ratio. In order tofind the corresponding levels of
output we note that equations (1) and (2) define the economy's production pos-
sibilities frontier. This frontier embodies the considerations underlying the
labor transformation function.3
The private sector's demand for non—tradable goods, DN,isassumed to be




The private demand for tradable goods, DT, can be represented by an analogous
function except that a rise in the real exchange rate is presumed to lower the
demand. Government demands for the two goods are denoted by GN and GT. The
subsequent analysis focuses on the adjustment of the economy to exogenous shocks
to aggregate demand. These shocks may arise from either an exogenous change in
private—sector wealth that impacts on aggregate demand, or from a change in the
level and composition of government spending.8
II. Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate and Real Wages: The Intermediate Run
In equilibrium the demand for non—tradable goods must equal the supply. On
the other hand differences between the demand and the supply for tradable goods
are reflected in the current account of the balance of payments. In this section
we determine the intermediate—run equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate
and of the sectorial real wages. These solutions provide the benchmark for the
analysis in section IV in which we determine optimal short—run policies.
11.1 The Real Exchange Rate
In specifying the equilibrium in the non—tradable goods sector it is con-
venient to start with the intermediate run during which nominal wages are flexi-
ble. Equilibrium in the non—tradable goods market requires that
(8) GN + , v)—xN(P) N N
In order to analyse the effects of exogenous shocks on the equilibrium real ex-
change rate, we differentiate equation (8) logarithmically and, denoting by lower
case letters the percentage change of a variable from its initial (pre—shock)
equilibrium value yields
(9) +A[q +v]x(q)
where and X=(1—A) are the relative shares of government and private sectors
demands for non-tradable goods in total demand. In equation (9) and q
denote the percentage change in government spending, private wealth, the output of
non—tradable goods and the real exchange rate, respectively, and denotes the9
elasticityof the demand with respect to the real exchange rate. The formulation
of (9) also assumes a unitary elasticity of demand withrespect to wealth.
Equation (9) can also be written in an alternative and more usefulway.
First, li-s right—hand side can be expressed in terms of thecorresponding changes
in labor input. Thus, using the production function,
(10) x(q)
where denotes the elasticity of output of the non—tradable goods withrespect
to labor input. Second, the left-hand—side of equation (9)can be decomposed into
termsinvolvingdirect changes in demand and terms which reflect indirectchanges
thatare induced by changes in the real exchange rate.We denote the direct
(exogeneous) changes in demand fornon—tradable goods by p, where
(11) P=Ag+ Av





Finally, solving for the equilibrium real exchange rate (ormore precisely the




Equation (12) expresses the equilibrium real exchange rate as a function of the
exogenous shock to the demand for non-tradable goods,
ij, andthe key parameters.
For example, a rise in the demand for non-tradable goods, induced by an exogenous
rise in government spending or by an exogenous rise in private sector wealth (a
positive iv),lowersq. The fall in q is smaller the higher is 8N——t1e elas-
ticity of non—tradable goods output with respect to the input of labor, and the
higher is A-—the relative share of private sector's demand in total demand for
non—tradable goods. Likewise, the fall in q is larger the higher are and
the (absolute values of the) elasticities of the marginal products of labor with
respect to the employment of labor services in the non—tradable goods sector. The
fall in q depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of the labor transformation
function. The higher the value of 0 the smaller the decline in q.
11.2 Sectorial Wages
The product wage in each sector (WN/PN and WT/PT) equals the corresponding
marginal product of labor. Therefore, the percentage change in the product wages
(wN_pN and wTpT) are —rNN and nTZN. We can use equation (6) for ZN and obtain
equations (13) and (1!) as the elasticities of the sectorial product wages with
respect to the real exchange rate:
wNpN_______ (13) 1>0
WT_PT_______ (114) = 1<0 qThus, a rise in the real exchange rate raises the product wage in the non—tradable
goods sector and lowers the product wage in the tradable goods sector. The ab-
solute values of these elasticities are higher the higher is the value of 0. In
the extreme case with 0=0 the product wage does not change in response to
changes in the real exchange rate.
In orderto find the effects ofchanges in the real exchange rate on the
realwagein terms of the consumption basket (henceforth the consumption wage) we
first define the consumer price index as a Cobb—Douglas function of the nominal
prices of tradable and non—tradable goods. Accordingly, p =ap
+TT'aN and
aT =laNare the corresponding expenditure shares. Hence, in the non—tradable
goods sector
W(P =WNPNPNWNPN —















As may be seen from equations (15)—(16) the intermediate—run effects of
changes in the real exchange rate on the two consumption wages are ambiguous due12
to the usual index—numbers problem. In the extreme case, however, with suffi-
ciently low values of 0, a rise in q must lower the consumption wage in the non—
tradable goods sector and must raise the consumption wage in the tradable goods
sector.
III. The Short Run
The foregoing analysis determined the equilibrium adjustment of the real
exchange rate and of sectorial wages in response to an exogenous change in ag-
gregate demand. The analysis pertained to the intermediate run in which labor
contracts are rewritten. As indicated earlier we distinguish between the short
run and the intermediate run. This distinction reflects labor market conditions.
Specifically, it is assumed that due to cost of negotiations there are labor
market contracts that set nominal wages in advance of the realization of the
stochastic shocks. According to the contracts, employers can choose the quantity
of labor services at the prevailing wage.[See, for example, Gray (1976), Fischer
(1977), Hall and Lazear (198)4)]. Accordingly, we define the short run as the run
during which nominal wages are given by the prevailing contract.
In the short run employment is demand—determined. Therefore, equation (6)
may not be used to determine the short-run changes in the employment of labor
services and, thereby, in the supply of non—tradable goods. In order to determine
these short—run changes we first note that the demand for labor in the non—trad-
able goods sector is governed by the real product wage WN/PN which, in turn, can
be written as (WN/SP)(PT/PN) where denotes the exogeneously given foreign
price of tradeable goods and where PT=SP; by the law of one price applicable to
internationally tradable goods. Since in the short-run is given, it follows
that thedemand for labor services in the non—tradable goods sector can bed_____ writtenas LN( *).It is assumed that the nominal wage is set in advance at
the level that is expected to clear the labor market. Thus, given the nominal
wage, further changes in the demand for labor during the period of the contract
(i.e., in the short run) can arise from unexpected changes in the realized real
product wage. Since the foreign price of tradable goods, T' is assumed to be
given, the percentage change in L is
5R (b =
whereaN denotes the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the demand for labor
with respect to the real product wage in the non—tradable goods sector, s andq
denote the unexpected changes in the nominal and the real exchange rates (relative
to the levels assumed when the nominal wage was set) and where SR denotes the
short run. Using the production function, the change in the level of output of
non—tradable goods corresponding to the change in labor input is
(10') x 8 a (s— N NN SR
Analogously, in the tradable—goods sector, the percentage changes in the demand






Substituting (10') for XN into (9) and using (11) yields114
(9'') +q= (s-q ) N SRNN SR
Solving for the short-run value of q yields
14)—1T OMS
(12') =— __________
Equation(12') reveals that in addition to its dependence on theexogenous
demand shock, p, theshort—run value of q depends positively in the (unexpected)
nominal exchange—rate policy. As seen in equation (9''), givenan initial real
exchange rate, an unexpected devaluation (i.e., a positive value of s), increases
the supply of non—tradable goods byNGNS without altering the demand.5 The
resulting excess supply is eliminated by a rise in q.It is noteworthy that in
the special case for which the authorities follow a fixedexchange—rate policy
(or, more generally, in the case for which the authorities maintain theprean—
nounced path of the nominal exchange rate) so that s=O, anexogeneous reduction in
the demand for non—tradable goods (a negative i)impliesfrom equations (12) and
(1 2') that the short—run real exchange rate rises and that0 < q < q (where
q denotes the intermediate—run change in the real exchange rate). These (weak)
inequalities imply that following the short—run rise in the realexchange rate
(consequent on an exogeneous decline in the demand for non—tradable goods), the
real exchange rate exhibits a further rise in the intermediaterun (consequent on
the reopening of wage contracts).
Associated with the equilibrium values of the real exchange rate thereare
equilibrium intersectorjal allocations of labor inputs andcommodity outputs. In
the intermediate run the levels of output are linkedthrough the commodity
production possibility frontier. On the other hand, in the shortrun, for thegiven contractual nominal wages, the levels of output are determined by the
sectorial demands for labor.
In order to determine the short run output effects of the rise in the real
exchange rate we recall from equations (10') and (10'') that for a fixed nominal
exchange rate the supply of non—tradable goods changes by -aq and the
supply of tradable goods is unchanged. Using equations (16)—(17) for the short
and the intermediate—run real exchange rates it can be shown that
SR SR
XN <XN < 0 = <XT(where XN and XTdenote the intermediate—run
changes in the outputs on non—tradable and tradable goods, respectively)
A comparison between the intertemporal changes in commodity outputs and the
correspondingchanges in the real exchange rate reveals that the intermediate—run
changes in output exhibit the typical positive association between the relative
price of a commodity and its supply. This positive association reflects the fact
that the economy operates along its production possibility frontier. On the other
hand, this association does not prevail in the short run. Thus, the short—run
supply of non—tradable goods is lower than the intermediate—run supply even though
its relative price (the inverse of the real exchange rate) is higher. This lack
of a positive association between the short—run relative price of non—tradable
goods and their supply reflects the fact that in the short run, with a fixed
nominal exchange rate, the economy does not operate along its production pos-
sibilityfrontier.
IV.The Optimal Adjustment of Nominal Wages
In this section we analyze the characteristics of optimal wage adjustment.
The need for nominal wage adjustment arises from the realization of the stochastic16
shocks. In the absence of wage adjustment the prevailing labor—market contracts
result in some stickiness of wages as in Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977).
Optimal wage adjustment yields a short—run equilibrium that replicates the
performance of an economy in which labor markets clear without the constraints
imposed by the existence of nominal wage contracts. By definition, such an
equilibrium obtaines in the intermediate run in which (due to the opening of
nominal wage contracts) the equilibrium structure of real wages is independent of
the prevailing (short—run) contractual nominal wage. In our framework, optimal
wage adjustments generate a short—run distribution of real wages which coincides
with the distribution obtained in the intermediate run.
In what follows we consider two alternative formulations of wage—adjustment
rules. The first relates changes in nominal wages to nominal exchange—rate poli-
cies and to the exogenous change in aggregate demand; the second relates the
optimal wage adjustment to the nominal exchange—rate policy and to the change in
the price level. .Inorder to compute the precise value of the equilibrium
nominal wages we note thatp =s—aqwhere p denotes the intermediate—run
change in the price level. Substituting into equation (15)—(16) and using






aToOaN b = >0 ; b= N >0 N
A(O+aTo)+6OaT
T17
Equations (17)—(18) specify the optimal rules for short—run nominal—wage
adjustments as functions of the unanticipated nominal exchange rate policy (s) and
the exogeneous change in aggregate demand for non—tradable goods (iv). The key
characteristics of the optimal rule lies in the separation between the optimal
adjustment of wages to nominal shocks (to which the optimal elasticity is unity)
and the corresponding adjustment to real shocks (to which the optimal elasticity
differs from unity). The elasticities bN and bT of nominal wages with respect
to the exogeneous change in demand differ across sectors. Specifically, bN
exceeds bT and the difference between these two elasticities increases with the of
openness of the economy (as measured by the relative share aT). Further, the
difference between bN and bT diminishes as the degree of homogeneity of relative
skills rises. At the limit, with e=,thetwo elasticities coincide and
=
bT
=aN/(XN0aT).As may be seen, in that case the elasticities decline
with the degree of openness. At the limit, as eapproachesinfinity and aT
approaches unity (while aN approaches zero), the magnitude of these elasticites
approaches zero. Finally, it is noteworthy that at the other extreme, with 8=0,
bT=O and bN =1/A
.Ingeneral, the difference between bN and bT reflects the
fact that with heterogeneous distribution of relative skills an exogeneous change
in the demand for non—tradable goods necessitates a change in the intersectorial
relative wage.
In order to gain further insight into the interdependencies among the
optimal values of the elasticities bN and bT, the degree of openness (as measured
by and the heterogeneity of the distribution of relative skills (as measured
by 8) we first derive the functional relation between bN and bT. Using the de-






The information conveyed by equation (2L) is summarized inFigure 3. In that
figure the negatively sloped AB schedule characterizes the relationbetween the
optimal values of bN and bT. The slope of this schedule depends on thedegree of
openness (a). The steeper schedule, AC, corresponds to a higher degree ofopen-
ness (4).Fora given degree of openness the position of the equilibriumalong
the negatively sloped schedule depends on theheterogeneity of the distribution of
relative skills as measured by 0. For example ifaT_aT and 0=0, the optimal
combination of bN and bT is at point A (along the verticalaxis), and if
aT a and 8 =, theoptimal combination is at point B (along the 5 line). A
rise in the value of 8 moves the optimal combination ofbN and bT towards point B
along the AB schedule.7
As is evident, the intermediate—run equilibrium isindependent of the
nominal exchange rate. Since the optimal short—runpolicy aims at replicating the
equilibrium of the intermediate run, it follows that in thepresent framework the
equilibrium real exchange rate and the equilibrium relative nominalwage can be
obtained for any nominal exchange—rate policy.8Therefore, the optimal nominal
exchange—rate policy must be determined on the basis of additionalconsiderations
that reflect concern with the levels of nominalwages or prices. Such considera-
tions may reflect concerns with the short—run distributionof income (the analysis
of which is provided in the Appendix), or someconstraints on feasible price and
wage adjustment.9
The foregoing analysis showed that optimalwage policies result in real—
wage changes which differ across sectors. Optimal policiesgenerate equilibrium





well as equilibrium sectorial changes in the consumption wage, as specified by
equations (15)—(16). The key point is that the equilibrium necessitates changes
in both the ratio of sectorial nominal wages (WN/WT) and the ratio of commodity
prices (PT/PN)——the real exchange rate. Attainment of these two targets requires
two (independent) instruments. This perspective suggests that nominal exchange—
rate policy alone cannot succeed in generating the necessary short—run wage ad-
justments since it does not alter the ratio of nominal wages.1°
It is important to emphasize, however, that equality between the number of
policy targets and instruments is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the attainment of a given set of policy goals. In terms of our formulation, as
long as the structure of relative nominal wages is given there is no set of policy
instruments that can yield the target of an undistorted equilibrium. As an
Illustration of this general principle we note that even though a proper
combination of fiscal and exchange—rate policies may be used in order to obtain a
desired level of aggregate employment and output mix, there is no way that such




In this paper we analysed the implications of a reduction in the demand for
domestic goods on the short—run and the intermediate—run values of the real ex-
change rate, the composition of output, real wages and the sectorial allocation of
employment; the Appendix analyses the effects on the functional distribution of
Income. While the reason for the exogeneous decline in demand was not specified
explicitely, it could be interpreted as part of a stabilization program or as a
response to an exogenous decline in current or prospective flows of foreign aid.20
One of the typical characteristics of an economy in need for a drastic
reduction in aggregate demand is a distorted structure of wages. Such a distor-
tion manifests itself in both the relative intersectorial wages and the absolute
levels thereof. In order to provide for a meaningful analysis of intersectorial
wage differentials without abandoning the main tenets of the competitive—neoclas-
sical paradigm, we allowed for heterogeneous distribution of skills.
In our framework ,labor—market contracts in each sector stipulate the
nominal—wage rule for the length of the contract period. The existence of con-
tracts and the length of the contract period reflect the cost of negotiations.
We showed that nominal exchange—rate policies alone can not succeed in alleviating
the undersirable consequences of the short—run stickiness of nominal wages.
The cost of a distorted structure of' wages can be eliminated only through a proper
adjustment of both the absolute and the relative nominal—wage structure. Our
analysis provided the precise formulae for the optimal intersectorial wage ad-
justment.
Rather than summarizing the results we outline in what follows some of the
limitations and further extensions. Our analysis did not attempt to contribute to
the growing body of literature on the theory of wage contracts. Rather, the form
of' the wage contract was taken as a stylized description of typical labor-market
conventions. Implicit in the formulation was the assumption that employers and
employees are risk neutral and, therefore, the existing contracts reflect only the
cost of negotiations. A useful extension would allow for risk aversion. With
risk aversion the existence of contracts could be rationalized in terms of the
insurance function.
Another extension would model explicitely the dynamic linkages between the
intermediate run and the long run, and would incorporate explicitely the process
of investment in human capital within a capital—theoretic framework. A more21
elaborate extension would recognize that in the long run there are no sector—
specific factors of production and the transition towards the long run includes
reallocation and accumulation of both human and material capital. Furthermore,
throughout the analysis we have assumed that the economy faces a once and for all
permanent shock. An extension which allows for transitory shocks would yield
dynamic paths of adjustments that depend critically on whether the shocks are
perceived as permenent or transitory.
Further, in our framework, the welfare loss arises only from a sub—optimal
wage distribution. Implicit in this specification is the assumption that except
for the labor market all other markets are undistorted. A useful extension would
provide for a richer formulation of the welfare cost arising from sub—optimal
money holdings, and would allow for the manifestation of the services of money and
for the erosion of these services as a result of the inflationaryprocess.
Finally,in focusing on the relation between government spending and the
key economic variables, we have not dealt with the important issues related to
government finance. A morecomplete treatment would specify the means of public
financealong with the specification of government outlays.22
APPENDIX
The Distribution of Income
In this Appendix we determine the effects of nominal and real exchange—rate
changes on the functional distribution of income. Since short—run changes in the
distribution of income differ from the corresponding intermediate—run changes,
their analysis provides insights into the formation of Interestgroups lobbying
for policy- measures. We start with the intermediaterun.
A. The Intermediate Run
Equations (13)—(i6) in section II showed the effects of real exchange—rate
changes on the intermediate-run values of equilibrium product and consumption
wages. Here we compute the analogous expressions for the returns to the sector—
specific capital. In order to simplify the exposition we will assume that the
production functions are of the Cobb—Douglas variety, and we denote the elas-
ticities of outputs of non-tradable and tradable goods with respect to the cor-
responding labor inputs by and T' respectively. Since capital is assumed to
be specific, the percentage change in the return to capital owners in each sector
can be measured by the percentage change in total capital income in the corre-
sponding sector. Accordingly, denoting the return to capital in the non—tradable




,itcan be shown that the percentage
change in the real return to capital, RN/P (to be denoted by (rN—p)) equals
Thus, using equation (6) for N' the elasticity of RN/P with respect to
the real exchange rate is23
rNp_______ (A—i)
q÷÷1T N NO
Similarly, it can be shown that (rT—P) equals which (for movements along
the labor transformation curve) is also equal to In this ex-
pression denotes the fraction of the total wage bill that accrues to labor
employed in the non—tradable goods sector and 4=i-denotesthe corresponding
share that accrues to labor employed in the tradable goods sector. Therefore,
using equation (6) for N' the elasticity of the real return to capital in the




The formulation in equations (A—i )—(A—2) reveals that the extent of the
change in the returns to capital depends on the heterogeneity of the distribution
of skills. At the extreme, with 0=0
,laboris also fully sector specific. In
that case the percentage change in the product wage in each sector exactly equals
the percentage change in the return to capital in that sector.
The elasticity of the wage ratio WN/WT with respect to the real exchange
rate is found by subtracting equation (15) from equation (16), and the elasticity
of the ratio of the returns to the two types of capitalRN/RT with respect to the
real exchange rate is found by subtracting equation (A-2) from (A—i). These
elasticities are
rNrT +(/) w -w
(A—3) 1N NT T<i< N T 1
q q 0(riN+nT)+i214
Inorder to compare the percentage changes in the sectoral wage—rental






q 1 q 1
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Thus,except for the special case for which 0=0, a change in the real exchange
rate impacts on the relative returns to labor and capital in each sector.
In summary, these results (along with those in equations (13)—(114) of the
text) can be combined to yield the chain of inequalities. In equation (A—5) which
also indicates the intermediate—run changes in the functional distribution of
income:.
(A—5) rN < < WN < WT < T < rT (for q>0,e>0)
These inequalities are reversed for the case in which q>0.
B. The Short Run
Weturn now to analyse the short—run effects of changes in the real ex-
change rate on wages and on the return to capital. In the short run, due to







Equations (A-6)—(A-7) show that these changes depend onthevalue of s which
reflects the short run nominal exchange—rate policy. We note that if theauthor-
ities maintain a fixed exchange rate so that s=O, then theproduct wage in the
tradable goods sector does riot change.
The short—run effects of the change in the real exchange rateon the real
wages measured in terms of the consumption basket are
(A—8) WN_P = P=
(A—9) WTP == s+q5
Thus, with s=O the elasticities of the consumptionwage with respect to the real
exchange rate are positive and equal toaN. This short—run result should be
compared with the corresponding intermediate—run results (reported inequations
(15)—(16) of the text), where we saw that the intermediate—run effectsof changes
in the real exchange rate on real wages wereambiguous.This comparison between
the short run and the intermediate—run results hasimplications concerning the
likelihood of the formation of interestgroups lobbying for policy measures.
Specifically, while the interest of labor (as measured in terms of thedirection
of changes in real wages) coincides across sectors in theshort run, these inter-
ests may diverge in the intermediate run. We proceed inanalyzing the short—run
effects of the changes in the real exchange rateon the return to capital.
Recalling that we use equation (6') for the short-run value of
ZN
and substitute (l/iiN) foraN in order to obtain:
rNp N (A—la) =—s—-—--a
q N T26
Analogously, recalling that the short—run elasticity of the
real return to capital in the tradable—goods sector is
rTp (N/T)8T
(A—il) = Sct q N
Equations (A—b)and(A—li) show that, analogously with the effects on the real
wages, the short—run real returns to capital depend on the nominal exchange rate
policy. For the case in which s=O, the elasticity of RN/P with respect to the
real exchange rate is negative whereas the corresponding elasticity of RT/P is
positive. Furthermore, with s=0 we note by comparing equations (A—lO)—(A--ll) with
(A—i)—(A—2) that the (algebreic value of the) intermediate—run elasticities of the
real returns to capital with respect to the real exchange rate exceed the cor-
responding short-run values.
The foregoing analysis determined the short—run effects of real exchange
rate changes on real wages and on the returns to capital in each sector. Since by
assumption the stock of capital employed in each sector is given, knowledge of
changes in rental rates is sufficient for determining total income to capital
owners. In contrast, since the employment of labor need not be fixed, the
computation of the wage bill requires that we supplement our analysis of changes
in the real wage with a corresponding analysis of the changes in the level of
employment. To simplify the exposition we will assume that N =T12
The real wage bill is (WNLN +WTLT)/P.Using the fact that with equal
sectoral labor intensities =c and TT' the percentage change in the wage bill
NN +TZTP•From equation (6') and (6") the percentage changes in the
levels of employment in the non—tradable and in the tradable goods sector are27
a(s—q5) and as, respectively. Substituting these expressions for and




Equation(A—12) shows that the short run change in the real wage bill depends
positively on the change in the price index. The change in the price, in turn,
depends on both the nominal and the real exchange—rates. Ceteris paribus, a
higher real exchange rate lowers p, and a higher nominal exchange rate raises p.
Thus, for the case in which s=O, the real wage bill falls when the real exchange
rate rises. This result is of some interest in view of our previous analysis of
the short—run changes in the consumption wages. As shown in equations (A-8)—(A-9)
a higher value of the real exchange rate raises the consumption wage in both
sectors by an elasticity of aN. The result in equation (A—2) implies that the
rise in q lowers the wage bill by an elasticity of aaN. It f'ollows that the
level of utilization of labor declines by an elasticity of
Finally we note that in the special case for which the price index is unchanged so
that p=O, real consumption wages as well as the wage bill do not change and,
therefore, in that special case the level of aggregate labor input remains un-
changed. In general, however, unexpected changes in the nominal exchange rate
alter the price level; it impacts on the level of aggregate labor utilization by
an elasticity that is equal to a. Such short—run changes in aggregate employment
level may also serve as an important determinant of the formation of interest
groups. Since in the intermediate run the level of aggregate employment remains
unchanged, differences between the short and the intermediate—run levels of
aggregate employment may also be responsible for the changes in the composition of
interest groups that take place over time.28
Footnotes
Formally, let the density function of skills bef(LN,LT). This function
measures the number of workers whose skills can yield labor services (LT,LN). The
total supply of labor services to each sector at the given wage ratio




In terms of Figurethe integration limit indicates the skill level of a
marginal worker. For example, if the marginal worker is worker c then for him
and, with a wage ratio ,LwL.Thus, at the margin, a reallocation of
workers between sectors implies that dLT/dLN=w. This property is used in equa-
tion (3)belowand can be derived formally by taking the ratio of the derivatives
0 0 ofLT and LN with respect to w.
principle the analysis could be extended to consider long run equi-
librium where the long run is defined as the run during which workers have been
allowed to acquire skills and, thereby, raise the value of 0. In the limit, as
the relative skill differentials narrows down, the value of 0 approaches infinity
and the labor transformation function becomes a straight line whose slope cor-
responds to the long—run equilibrium wage ratio. In this paper we focus on the
short—run and on the intermediate—run and we do not analyse the dynamic evolution29
of the economy towards long—run equilibrium. The transition towards the long run
can be described in terms of investments in human capital. For such formulations
see Aizenman (1983) and Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). A more complete analysis
would also allow for the gradual transformation of all the specific fixed factors
into variable mobile factors of production. For a formulation of the dynamics of
specific physical capital see Mussa (1978, 1982a).
3Formally, the link between the production possibilities frontier andthe
labor transformation function can be expressed in terms of the corresponding
elasticities of' substitution. For example, denoting the elasticities of substitu-
tion along the labor transformation function and along the production possibility
frontier by and a, respectively, where and
we get for the Cobb—Douglas case with equal sectoral
labor shares and oX=/[1—+(czT/O)J whereaT denotes the expenditure
share of spending on tradable goods. Thus, aX=/[1—8÷(1/aL)J. As Is evident if
e, and
richer formulation could also allow for the effects of real interest
rates on spending as in Bruno (1976), Martin and Sellowsky (1981) and Dornbusch
(1983). It is noteworthy, however, that the key conclusions of the present analy-
sis do not depend upon the real interest rate effect; for such an extensionsee
Aizenman and Frenkel (1985b).
5The assumption that theunexpected change in the nominal exchange rate
does not alter the demand presumes that the value of wealth (or permanent income)
is independent of s and, therefore, ijidoesnot change in response to s. More
generally, as long as the marginal propensity to spend on non—tradable goods out
of transitory income is smaller than unity, an unexpected devaluation createsan
excess supply and results in a rise in q.30
6Inderiving equation (19)weuse a variant of the undetermined coeffi-
cients method. We start by postulating a linear relation bN= al+a2bT. We then
substitute the definitions of bN and bT from equation (18), collecting terms and
equating coefficients of corresponding variables, yields the value of the coeffi-
cients a1 and a2.As is seen, even though the optimal values of bN and bT depend on
0, the functional relation between these elasticities is independent of 0. This
independence implies that changes in 0 which may occur over time do not impact on
the functional relation characterizing the optimal wage formulae. Therefore, this
functional relation isindependentof time.
7The optimal rules for short—run nominal—wage adjustments can also be cast
in terms of indexation rules by which changes in nominal wages are indexed to
changes in the nominal exchange rate and to changes in the price level. Such
rules can be written as wN =as
+apand WT=as
+ap,where a and a
denote the coefficients of indexation of nominal—wage adjustment to s, and where
a and a denote the corresponding coefficients of adjustment to p.It can be
shown [see Aizenman and Frenkel (1985b) that the optimal coefficients are
a ao a ao 5 T T p(T T s T p 0 a ,a=1+ ,a= ,anda = ,As N 0ao aN N O+aTo aN T0+aa T 0aa
seen, the smaller is the value of 0, the higher becomes the intersectoral dif-
ference between nominal wage adjustment rules. As 0approaches Infinity, the
optimal indexation of nominal wage adjustment to changes in the price level Is
unity whereas the corresponding coefficients of indexation to exchange rate
changes is zero. Also a higher degree of openness is associated with a higher
degree of optimal wage adjustment to changes in the nominal exchange rate.
can also be observed byreferenceto equations (17) and (18)which
expressthe optimal wage adjustment as a function of the nominal exchange—rate
policy (s)andthe change in aggregate demand fornon—tradablegoods (iv).Inthat31
connection it is seen that different values of s do not alter the equilibrium
ratio of nominal wages.
9For example,suppose that institutional constraints prevent a reduction in
nominal wages. In that case nominal exchange—rate policy must accompany the fall
in demand (i.e. ip<O). Specifically, equations (17)—(18) imply that in order to
keep the nominal wage in the non—tradable goods sector unchanged, the fall in
demand which governs the value of imustbe accompanied by a devaluation so that
s+bNi=O. In that case the nominal wage in the tradable—goods sector rises by
(bTbN)1. Alternatively, suppose that the authorities wish to neutralize the
price—level consequences of the policies. Since in general p=s—ctq, it follows
that in order to stabilize the price level, the package of optimal policies should
include a devaluation so that This devaluation must be accompanied by
changes in nominal wages in order to generate a stable price. A package of
optimal policies which includes a devaluation yielding a stable price, must lower
the nominal wage in the non—tradable goods sector and raise the nominal wage in
the tradable goods sector. The precise wage adjustemnts can be read form the wage
equations in footnote 7 for p=O.
10The only circumstance under which nominal exchange—rate policy alone can
yield optimal short—run equilibrium arises when the distribution of relative
skills is homogeneous (i.e., when O=a).Inthat case relative nominal wages are
always constant and are independent of the real exchange rate. In this special
case as shown in Aizenman and Frenkel (1985a, 1985c) wage indexation rules bear an
exact dual relation to monetary policy rules. In the more general case as shown
by Blinder and Mankiw (19811) and as illustrated in the present paper aggregative
policies (like monetary policy or nominal exchange rate policy) are not suitable
for dealing with sector—specific shocks. For a related analysis of optimal poli-
cies in the presence of firm—specific shocks see Marston and Turnovsky (1985).32
For a detailed analysis of the interactions among fiscal policies,
exchange—rate policies and the output mix see Aizenman and Frenkel (985b) where
it is shown that for a given nominal wage structure, the ratio ofcommodity
outputs depends uniquely on the real exchange rate whereas the aggregate level of
employment depends uniquely on the price level (and thereby on the nominal ex-
change rate); hence, as long asB < ,fiscaland exchange—rate policies may be
use to yield a desired employment level and output mix.
this simplification aT=aN=/(l—8), and the values of the expendi-
ture shares on the two goods equal the corresponding shares of the sectoral labor—
income in total wage bill. Thus, and ctT=4. This simplification allows us
to abstract from issues arising from intersectoral differences in relative labor
Intensities and to focus on issues arising from short-run nominal contracts and
intermediate—run heterogeneity of the distribution of relative skills. Withour
assumption, the long—run concavity of the production possibility frontier arises
only due to the diminishing marginal productivities of labor in the presence of
the sector—specific capital. In the absence of sector—specificcapital the
assumption that 8N=T implies that when O=, the production possibility frontier
is a straight line.
131t is relevant toreemphasize that due to the heterogeneity of the
distribution of relative skills, the concept of employment (as measured by the
number of workers) differs from the concept of labor input (as measuredby labor
services). In our case, with Cobb—Douglas production functions and withequal
sectoral factor shares, the composite index of labor input can be defined as
(WNLN +WTLT)/(WNWT).33
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